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[James] Madison entertained an intelligent view of 
the causes affecting the value of paper money. "It 
depends on the credit of the State issuing it, and on 
the time of its redemption; and is no otherwise 
affected by the quantity than as the quantity may be 
supposed to endanger or postpone the redemption." 
—Albert Bolles, 1884 
Central to most thinking about monetary theory and 
monetary policy is a version of the quantity theory of 
money. According to Lucas (1980, p. 1005), "two 
central implications of the quantity theory of money... 
[are] that a given change in the rate of change in the 
quantity of money induces (i) an equal change in the 
rate of price inflation; and (ii) an equal change in 
nominal rates of interest." Lucas goes on to state (p. 
1005) that these propositions "possess a combination of 
theoretical coherence and empirical verification shared 
by no other propositions in monetary economics." 
While Lucas does not state what this empirical 
verification consists of, it seems safe to assume that it 
includes the findings of Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 
p. 676) that, since the Civil War, "changes in the be-
havior of the money stock have been closely associated 
with changes in economic activity, money income, and 
prices .... The interrelation between monetary and 
economic change has been highly stable." It also likely 
includes the claim of Friedman (1960, p. 2) that, since 
World War II, "no country succeeded in stemming 
inflation without adopting measures directed at re-
straining the growth of the stock of money," as well as 
the conclusion of Schwartz (1973, p. 264) that, at least 
since the time of Alexander the Great, "long-run price 
changes consistently parallel the monetary changes, 
with one exception for England in the sixteenth cen-
tury." 
These conclusions and Lucas' propositions have 
been so firmly held by economists that they are often 
built into (rather than derived from) economic models. 
They also influence everyday thinking about the role of 
the Federal Reserve System, in that the central bank is 
charged (under this view) with preventing secular 
inflation, increases in interest rates, and so on. 
However, despite Lucas' assertions about theoretical 
coherence and empirical verification, the quantity 
theory propositions described above have come under 
sharp theoretical and empirical scrutiny. On theoretical 
grounds, the asserted effects of monetary changes on 
prices and inflation have been challenged by Wallace 
(1981) and by Sargent and me (1986, 1987). In 
particular, we have produced economic models in 
which the consequences of monetary changes, even for 
nominal magnitudes, depend crucially on how such 
changes are accomplished. Loosely speaking, our work 
directs economic observers to examine the consoli-
*I acknowledge very helpful conversations with John McCusker. My 
epigraph is from Albert Bolles' 1884 book, The Financial History of the United 
States, From 1774 to 1789, vol. 1,4th ed., p. 147, fn. 1, New York: D. Appleton 
and Co. (reprinted in 1969, New York: Augustus M. Kelley). 
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dated balance sheet of a nation's treasury and central 
bank. Monetary changes that affect total liabilities on 
this consolidated balance sheet (without compensating 
changes in assets) will have the effects Lucas predicts. 
However, monetary changes that do not result in 
changes in this consolidated balance sheet can actually 
be irrelevant for prices and interest rates. To illustrate 
this point, Sargent and 1(1987) provide an example of a 
once-and-for-all change in the money stock that pro-
duces no changes in prices or interest rates. 
These Wallace/Sargent-Smith results have some 
quite dramatic implications for the conduct of mone-
tary policy. One is that open market operations ac-
complished with fiscal policy held constant (that occur 
with the consolidated balance sheet of the treasury and 
the central bank unaltered) have no effect on prices. 
Another implication is that government attempts to 
manage foreign exchange rates can be effective only if 
accompanied by fiscal actions that have redistributive 
consequences. (See Sargent and Smith 1986.) 
Of course, if these theoretical results lack empirical 
verification, as Lucas implicitly suggests, then the 
results are rightly not of great interest to economic 
policymakers or monetary economists. However, at 
least on the surface, there appears to exist quite strong 
empirical support for them. For instance, Sargent 
(1982), Bomberger and Makinen (1983), Makinen 
(1984), Smith (1984;1985a,b), Wicker (1985), White 
(1986), and Imrohoroglu (1987) provide evidence of a 
number of episodes in which very large monetary 
changes occur (in some cases, over quite long periods) 
and in which price levels and currency values are 
extremely stable. In most of these cases, it is fairly 
apparent that the monetary changes were accom-
plished without significant effects on the consolidated 
balance sheet of the relevant treasury and central bank. 
These episodes thus provide a wide range of empirical 
support for the Wallace/Sargent-Smith view and 
against the Lucas version of the quantity theory. 
That more such evidence will appear seems likely as 
well, since Redish (1985) suggests the existence of 
similar evidence for periods in early Canadian history, 
for instance.
1 Given the cumulation of this kind of 
evidence and its important implications for monetary 
economics, it seems appropriate to briefly review the 
findings of some of this literature, as well as some 
reactions to these findings. 
Sargent (1982) has examined the experiences of four 
European economies as they emerged from hyperin-
flations after World War I. One of his findings is that 
each of these economies experienced extremely rapid 
growth in its money supply for some time after the price 
level had been stabilized. Post-hyperinflation Germany, 
for instance, saw its money supply increase by a factor 
of nearly four in the year following price stabilization. 
Sargent argues that these monetary changes were 
accomplished without altering the net balance sheet 
positions of the relevant treasury and central bank. 
Thus, these episodes support the propositions derived 
by Wallace, Sargent, and me. Subsequently, Bomberger 
and Makinen (1983) and Makinen (1984) have accu-
mulated similar evidence based on the experiences of 
other countries emerging from hyperinflations. 
The evidence presented by Sargent (1982) is not 
universally regarded as being inconsistent with the 
quantity theory, however. Under one interpretation, the 
hyperinflations essentially destroyed the monetary sys-
tems of these economies, which were then simply 
remonetizing after the stabilizations. Another interpre-
tation is that the reforms that accompanied price 
stabilization required some adjustment in the expecta-
tions of agents: Changes in expectations over time 
increased the demand for money, preventing increases 
in the money supply from producing inflation.
2 Thus, 
further presentation of evidence is called for. 
I have presented an array of evidence consistent with 
Sargent's (Smith 1984 and 1985a,b). Moreover, much 
of this evidence is not readily explained by appealing 
to changes in monetary systems or expectations. In 
particular, many researchers have observed that, in the 
British North American colonies, there were several 
episodes in which the money supply apparently 
changed dramatically over long periods. These changes 
were quite often not accompanied by any price level 
movements. For instance, in 1760-70, the colony of 
New York reduced its per capita currency supply 86 
percent, but available evidence indicates that the price 
level fell only 3 percent over the same period. This kind 
of experience was repeated in different colonies and 
1 Notice that all of this evidence is historical in nature. This is because the 
Wallace/Sargent-Smith models predict different economic behavior from that 
which Lucas predicts only when monetary changes occur that are not ac-
companied by changes in the consolidated balance sheet of the treasury and the 
central bank. This rules out the use of postwar time series data to discriminate 
between the competing hypotheses. 
This is not to say that there is no modern evidence on this issue, however. 
Miller (1983) presents evidence that, since the mid-1960s, changes in the net 
liability position of the U.S. Treasury-Federal Reserve System, rather than 
changes in the money supply alone, have been the relevant variable from the 
point of view of price level changes. 
Also, there is much more historical evidence against Lucas' propositions 
than I have cited above. See, for example, the discussion of the historical French 
experience in Riley and McCusker 1983. 
2The latter argument is acknowledged by Sargent (1982, n. 20). 
19 different time periods. In addition, these monetary 
changes were accomplished with only minor changes in 
the (consolidated) government balance sheet. Hence, 
these observations are consistent with the Wallace/ 
Sargent-Smith propositions and inconsistent with the 
quantity theory. Moreover, since no regime changes (or 
monetary reforms) had occurred, the counterarguments 
that are available against Sargent's interpretation of 
events are not available in the colonial context.
3 
Limitations in the kind of data that are available for 
the colonial period have, however, led to some question-
ing of this interpretation of events. Specifically, the only 
data that are available on colonial money supplies are 
measures of the amount of paper money issued by each 
colony.
41 have related this money supply measure to 
movements in colonial prices and exchange rates, 
finding that in many cases large money supply move-
ments produced no changes in price levels or currency 
values. Still, in addition to their own paper currencies, 
the colonies had stocks of specie (coins) that circulated 
within them. Since no data on colonial specie stocks 
exist, any money supply measures necessarily omit this 
component of the money stock. In fact, I have discussed 
this omission (in Smith 1984 and 1985a,b) and pre-
sented some arguments about why the inability to 
measure the quantity of specie is unlikely to be of 
concern in interpreting the colonial evidence. These 
arguments center on indications that the specie stock 
was generally a fairly small component of the colonial 
money supply. 
Subsequent work by Bordo (1986), Bordo and 
Marcotte (1987), and Michener (1987) has called into 
question whether unobserved movements in the specie 
stock invalidate my interpretation of the colonial 
evidence. Together, these authors argue that specie was 
actually a large component of the colonial money 
supply. Moreover, they believe that movements in the 
stock of specie systematically counteracted movements 
in the stock of paper money, so that the movements in 
the money supply observed by me and others were 
completely illusory. Thus, for instance, in 1760-70, 
when the stock of paper money fell 86 percent in New 
York, the total stock of money was actually unchanged, 
according to Bordo, Marcotte, and Michener. In partic-
ular, in their view, as the paper currency stock declined, 
there were massive inflows of specie which exactly 
offset the effects of that contraction. Moreover, they 
believe this was true in each episode I have examined. 
Bordo, Marcotte, and Michener do not provide 
evidence to support this position. Thus, they must 
provide a further argument in order to make their 
position plausible. A second part of their criticism of 
my work, then, is that I (and earlier historians of 
colonial monetary affairs) fundamentally misunder-
stand the monetary regime under which the colonies 
operated. Specifically, I have presented the colonies as 
operating under a flexible exchange rate system, in 
which colonial currencies circulated at market-deter-
mined rates against other currencies (sterling, for 
example). Bordo, Marcotte, and Michener view the 
colonies as operating under a fixed exchange rate 
system, in which colonial currencies bore a fixed value 
in terms of specie. Under this view, the colonies were 
small open economies operating under fixed exchange 
rates. According to standard quantity theory reasoning, 
then, the colonial money supplies were completely 
determined by the necessity of maintaining this fixed 
rate. When the colonies were attempting to change their 
money supplies by printing or withdrawing paper 
currency, their efforts were to no avail, and the paper 
currency measures I have used do not reflect actual 
changes in the total money supply.
5 
The purpose of this paper is to review where the 
colonial evidence stands in light of the Bordo/Bordo-
Marcotte/Michener critique. Thus, the paper asks these 
three questions and answers them in the following way: 
• How important was specie as a component of the 
colonial money supply? It is not possible to know 
how much specie there was in the colonies. Many 
historians believe that there was very little and that 
what specie there was did not function as a medium 
of exchange. However, even if we take an agnostic 
position on this issue, historical evidence suggests 
that there was not enough specie to invalidate my 
earlier conclusions. 
• Were there specie flows that invalidate the evidence I 
have presented? In some of the most dramatic 
episodes I have discussed (Smith 1985a,b), all 
evidence suggests that the stock of specie and the 
3See also Wicker 1985 for a similar interpretation of these events. 
Calomiris (1988) discusses the lack of support for the quantity theory in these 
historical episodes and presents an explanation for its failure in terms of 
monetary/fiscal interactions. These interactions are not the ones emphasized by 
me (Smith 1984 and 1985a,b) or by Wallace (1981) and Sargent and me 
(1987), however. Finally, White (1986) suggests strong parallels between parts 
of French and Spanish history and the American colonial experience. 
4Colonial monetary institutions and some components of the colonial 
money supply are discussed in the next section. 
5 Surprisingly, given that this is their description of events, Bordo and 
Marcotte (1987) and Michener (1987) make no attempt to discuss why colonial 
governments continually attempted to manipulate their money supplies. Nor do 
they explain why the quantity of paper money emitted was such a contentious 
subject in many colonies. 
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stock of paper money moved together. Thus, 
offsetting specie flows are not a possibility. In other 
cases, it is possible to place bounds on the specie 
stock that indicate that offsetting specie flows were 
not feasible. 
• Is it plausible to think of the colonies as operating 
under a fixed exchange rate regime? The literature 
reviewed above does not suggest a plausible mech-
anism by which a fixed exchange rate system could 
have been maintained in the colonies. 
The paper begins with a brief review of colonial 
monetary arrangements. Then I review the quantity 
theory and the Wallace/Sargent-Smith propositions, 
discuss why the nature of the colonial exchange rate 
regime is at issue, and offer some comments on why the 
colonies present particularly interesting evidence re-
garding these different approaches to monetary theory 
and policy. Next I present evidence on specie flows for 
three colonies discussed by Michener. And finally I 
examine the colonial exchange rate regime and argue 
that there is no reason to view the colonies as operating 
under fixed exchange rates. 
Money in the Colonies 
The term money applied to the colonies has been taken 
by various historians to include a large number of 
different objects. However, in the discussions of Smith 
(1984;1985a,b), Wicker (1985), Bordo (1986), Bordo 
and Marcotte (1987), and Michener (1987), the term 
can be taken to mean paper currency issued by the 
colonies themselves and specie.
6 
Each colony had its own unit of account; in the 
period under consideration, it was called a pound of the 
currency of the colony in question. Before the colonies 
printed (or minted) their own currencies, these pounds 
were simply abstract accounting units—almost no 
money existed denominated in them. Once paper 
money was issued, it was denominated in the unit of 
account of the colony issuing it, and in fact, this paper 
money would be the only money denominated in this 
unit of account. Finally, for the colonies discussed here, 
it is reasonable to view each colony as being able to 
operate an independent monetary policy. 
To study the empirical relevance of the Wallace/ 
Sargent-Smith propositions, the colonies are ideal. This 
is because, according to the way colonial monetary 
systems were intended to operate, all changes in the co-
lonial money supply were supposed to be accompanied 
by changes that preserved the colony's (consolidated) 
balance sheet position. 
More specifically, in the colonies discussed here, 
there were only two methods for increasing the stock of 
paper currency. One was to print currency in order to 
finance government deficits, that is, to directly purchase 
goods and services. At the same time the currency was 
issued, the government would levy specific future taxes. 
These taxes could be paid either in paper currency or in 
specie accepted at a defined rate in lieu of paper 
currency. Such taxes provided a mechanism for retiring 
the currency issued. More important, though, is the fact 
that, if levied in sufficient amounts, these taxes provided 
a source of future revenues which would roughly 
maintain the colony's (consolidated) balance sheet 
position.
7 
The other method of introducing currency in the 
colonies was to print it and issue it in the form of loans 
to private citizens. When loans were repaid, the curren-
cy was to be retired. Moreover, these loans constituted 
an asset acquired by colonial governments, again 
preserving their net balance sheet positions. (Methods 
used by the colonies to insure the security of these loans 
are discussed in Smith 1985a,b and 1987.) Thus, all 
monetary issues were intended to be backed by actions 
preserving the net balance sheet positions of the 
colonial governments. In the colonies to be discussed 
below, existing evidence suggests that the governments 
were in fact quite scrupulous in attempting to offset 
monetary increases with either current asset acquisi-
tions or future tax revenues (Smith 1985a). 
In addition to paper currency, gold and silver coins 
circulated in the colonies. These were mostly of Spanish 
and Portuguese origin, entering the British colonies 
through trade with Spanish and Portuguese colonies. 
These coins were not denominated in the unit of 
account of any colony. Moreover, the scope for them to 
circulate was limited by the fact that much specie was in 
relatively large denominations, inhibiting its use in 
ordinary transactions. (See Hanson 1979, 1980 and 
McCusker and Menard 1985, p. 339.) 
How important was specie as a component of the 
colonial money supply? Here opinions differ greatly. 
Ferguson (1961, p. 4), in his justly celebrated study The 
Power of the Purse, says that "what coin existed in the 
colonies came mainly from trade with the Spanish and 
6 For a discussion of other candidates for inclusion in the money supply, see 
Smith 1987. There I also discuss why the absence of data on these candidates is 
not of great concern for the purpose of this paper. 
7 Wicker (1985) pursues a related line of reasoning. This method of creating 
currency converts all decisions about government finance into decisions purely 
about the timing of taxation. Hence, the arguments raised initially by Barro 
(1974) are relevant. 
21 French West Indies. Its circulation was largely confined 
to merchants, and its stay was likely to be of short 
duration—it was a commodity for export rather than a 
medium of exchange." In expressing this view, Fergu-
son could easily have been paraphrasing many colonial 
authors. For instance, Benjamin Franklin referred to 
"silver..., which is now become a merchandise, rising 
and falling like other commodities as there is a greater 
or less demand for it or as it is more or less plenty" 
(quoted in Bullock 1900, pp. 54-55). Brock (1975, p. 
166) quotes a committee of the South Carolina assem-
bly to the same effect: "gold and silver had 'for the most 
part been dealt for as a merchandize, and not as a 
currency in payments, or a medium of trade.'" More-
over, with respect to the amount of specie available, 
Brock (1975, p. 532) says that "in ordinary times, the 
supply of specie was at best meagre and uncertain, and 
was not infrequently wanting altogether." 
Taking the opposite position is Michener (1987), 
who says that "colonial [paper] currency passed in 
domestic transactions at a customary fixed rate with 
pieces of eight" (p. 258) and who believes that "over 
two thirds of the money supply must have been specie in 
New York and Pennsylvania in 1774" (p. 275).
8 This 
estimate is not consistent with other existing estimates, 
however. In the historical literature, the estimate that 
most closely approximates Michener's is that of Weiss 
(1970, p. 779), who estimates specie to have constituted 
between 52 and 60 percent of the money supply in New 
York and Pennsylvania at this time. Estimates that 
appear to receive more support in the historical litera-
ture are Letwin's (1981) that specie could have been no 
more than 40 percent of the money supply of Pennsyl-
vania at this time and McCusker and Menard's (1985) 
that about 25 percent of the colonial money supply was 
specie.
9 Not only is Michener's estimate of the specie 
stock inconsistent with other estimates, but Michener 
makes no attempt to reconcile his estimate with his-
torical assertions that there was only a "minor amount 
of coin" in Pennsylvania in 1770-75, for instance 
(Bezanson 1951, p. 10). 
The fact of the matter is that historians do not now 
know, and quite likely will not ever know, how much 
specie was in the colonies, either in absolute amount or 
relative to paper currency. The bulk of historical 
evidence suggests, however, that it was much less than 
half of the colonial money supply. Moreover, we know 
that many colonies were especially poor in specie. It is 
perhaps best to consider the case of each colony 
separately, as I have done elsewhere (in Smith 1987). 
Fortunately, however, for this study it is not necessary 
to take a stand on how much specie was available in the 
colonies as a whole, since the arguments presented 
below will not depend on this. 
It remains, then, to discuss the exchange rate regime 
in the colonies. This discussion is best deferred, how-
ever, until after a description of the quantity theory and 
the Wallace/Sargent-Smith propositions. Then I can 
discuss more clearly why the nature of the colonial 
exchange rate regime is at issue. 
Two Views About Money and Prices 
The Quantity Theory 
In its most basic form, the quantity theory simply asserts 
that money times velocity equals nominal income. This 
statement can, in fact, be taken as a definition of 
(income) velocity and as such has no empirical content. 
In order to give the quantity theory empirical content, it 
is necessary to provide further economic structure. For 
my purpose here, it is convenient to adopt Friedman's 
(1956) assertion that velocity (or money demand) is a 
stable function of real income, nominal interest rates, 
and possibly expected inflation. Under suitable side 
hypotheses about the response of real income and real 
interest rates to long-run monetary changes, Fried-




 Thus, for the purpose of this paper, 
Friedman's specification can be taken as a definition of 
8Bordo (1986) and Bordo and Marcotte (1987) apparently accept 
Michener's views on this. 
9There are, admittedly, problems encountered by McCusker and Menard 
(1985) in arriving at this estimate, which are discussed by Michener (1987, 
pp. 278-79). There are, however, problems in constructing any such estimate. 
Consider, for instance, Michener's estimate, arrived at by using Jones' (1980) 
studies of colonial probate records for 1774. There are at least three serious 
problems with using these records for the purposes to which Michener puts 
them. First, by definition, probate records represent the financial holdings of 
older (and wealthier) individuals than the population as a whole. Second, Jones 
examines probate records only for the year 1774, while it is known that "values 
reported by probate inventories, particularly financial assets and liabilities, 
fluctuated violently in response to the changing fortunes of the export sector" 
(McCusker and Menard 1985, p. 264). Third, "while designed to generate an 
unbiased wealth estimate for probated decedents, the [Jones] sample is small... 
and the standard error large; one wonders if the numbers are sufficient to 
support the elaborate weighting and adjustment needed to generate figures for 
the living population" (McCusker and Menard 1985, p 265). The last problem 
is highlighted by Michener's (1987, p. 275) admission that only 38 percent of 
sampled probate inventories report any holdings of cash, which illustrates the 
potential for substantial standard errors. For further elaboration on these points, 
see McCusker and Menard 1985, pp. 264-65. [By the way, Weiss (1970) also 
uses Jones' probate studies to arrive at his figures.] 
Michener (1987, p. 280) also cites Bullock (1900, pp. 176-77) and Brock 
(1975, p. 447) as providing evidence that specie was plentiful in the colonies. 
My reading of Bullock's work is that he actually asserts the contrary. A reading 
of pp. 446-47 in Brock 1975 indicates that the specie stock of South Carolina 
expanded in concert with a major expansion in the paper currency stock. This 
cannot provide support for Michener's position. 
10More elegant derivations of quantity theory propositions like that of 
Lucas (1982) could also have been examined. 
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the quantity theory. 
What does the quantity theory predict will happen as 
a result of a long-run change in the money supply (or 
the money growth rate), then? Under the hypothesis of 
long-run neutrality of money, real income and real 
interest rates will be unaffected. Other predicted chang-
es depend on the exchange rate regime. 
Consider a small open economy, that is, one whose 
actions have negligible effects on world prices. If this 
economy has a flexible exchange rate with other 
currencies, its actions will not affect world prices. 
Hence, its exchange rate will depreciate in proportion to 
the increase in the money supply, and its domestic price 
level will rise proportionally. 
But consider a small open economy with a fixed 
exchange rate. Under the quantity theory, the fixed 
exchange rate and world prices determine domestic 
prices and inflation. Since real income and interest rates 
are not affected by monetary changes, the hypothesis of 
stable money demand (or velocity) implies that the 
domestic money supply must be unaltered. Thus, a 
change in one component of the money supply requires 
offsetting changes in other components, or in foreign 
holdings of domestic currency. In a setting like the 
colonies, offsetting specie flows would be a possibility. 
Now consider the colonies. Existing historical evi-
dence suggests that in the colonies long-run variations 
in per capita real income and nominal interest rates 
were relatively minor (Smith 1987). Then, if the 
colonies had flexible exchange rates with other curren-
cies, large monetary changes should have produced 
proportional changes in price levels under the quantity 
theory. If the colonies had fixed exchange rates, how-
ever, large monetary changes should have produced 
large offsetting specie flows.
1
1
 Notice that under the 
quantity theory, long-run changes in the stock of paper 
currency issued must create either proportional long-
run movements in prices and exchange rates or offset-
ting specie flows. If neither results, then the quantity 
theory fails to explain these historical episodes (inde-
pendently of the exchange rate regime). 
A Different View 
Wallace (1981) and Sargent and I (1986,1987) present 
models which have implications sharply at variance 
with the quantity theory. In these models, it is possible 
for long-run changes in the money supply to have no 
effect on the price level or exchange rates, even under a 
flexible exchange rate regime. Our reasoning parallels 
that underlying the Modigliani-Miller theorem for 
corporate finance. In particular, Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) present circumstances under which the follow-
ing result holds: a corporation cannot affect its market 
value purely by rearranging its liabilities (say, between 
debt and equity). 
Wallace, Sargent, and I present models in which the 
same reasoning applies to the government. More 
specifically, in our analyses, pure reorganizations of the 
government balance sheet (the consolidated balance 
sheet of the treasury and the central bank) do not affect 
the market value of government liabilities, including 
currency, and hence do not affect the price level. But as 
this reasoning makes clear, only monetary changes that 
represent pure rearrangements of the (consolidated) 
government balance sheet will leave price levels (and 
other measures of currency values, such as exchange 
rates) unaffected. 
That last caveat is important. In general, when 
central banks engage in open market operations, they 
exchange non-interest-bearing liabilities, like curren-
cy, for interest-bearing liabilities, like bonds. In the 
absence of any other actions by the government, such 
an exchange will alter retained earnings on the gov-
ernment's portfolio and hence will not be a pure 
rearrangement of the government balance sheet. Thus, 
an important part of the Wallace/Sargent-Smith anal-
ysis is that monetary changes accomplished through 
open market operations be accompanied by govern-
ment rebates of excess earnings on the government 




In practice, open market operations are rarely 
accompanied by such rebates, so the Wallace/Sargent-
Smith results will not apply. Clearly, randomly selected 
episodes will not shed light on whether these models are 
empirically relevant. However, the colonies are ideal 
for studying these models because colonial govern-
ments routinely rebated, through tax reductions, the 




 Since colonial currencies did not circulate outside the colonies and since 
the colonies had no banks—and, hence, no bank-created money—the only 
candidate for compensating changes in the money supply is specie. 
1
2
 An example of some confusion caused by a failure to understand that the 
Wallace/Sargent-Smith analysis requires essentially only that these rebates 
occur is the discussion in Michener 1987, pp. 245-53. Michener criticizes me 
(Smith 1984 and 1985 a,b) for applying the analysis just outlined to the colonies. 
His criticism takes the form of arguing that the colonies did not always retire 
currency as scheduled; hence, the analysis does not apply to the colonies. Such a 
criticism is clearly misplaced. An examination of Sargent and Smith 1987 will 
indicate that the timing of government transactions plays no role in our 
argument. The important element is, rather, the manipulation of taxes and other 
payments to the government in such a way as to hold earnings on the 
government portfolio constant. 
23 Finally, in contrast to the situation under the quantity 
theory, the Wallace/Sargent-Smith results can be stated 
without reference to the prevailing exchange rate 
regime (Sargent and Smith 1986). Thus, our analyses 
predict that colonial monetary changes will produce no 
effects on price levels, exchange rates, or specie flows, 
independently of the colonial exchange rate regime. 
The Evidence: Currency vs. Specie Flows ... 
I now review three colonial episodes in which large 




 These changes were apparently accom-
plished without significant effects on the balance sheets 
of the relevant colonial governments. Thus, the Wallace/ 
Sargent-Smith propositions suggest that no significant 
changes should have been observed in prices or ex-
change rates. Since this is what occurred, colonial 
evidence supports this view. For the events described to 
be consistent with the quantity theory, however, move-
ments in the stock of paper currency must have been 
offset by changes in other components of the money 
supply (specie). Moreover, this would have to be the 
case independently of the prevailing exchange rate 
regime. Available evidence about movements in the 
stock of specie for these colonies during 1755-70 is 
now reviewed. As will be seen, the specie flows required 
for the colonial evidence to be consistent with the 
quantity theory do not seem to have occurred. (A 
systematic review of the evidence concerning specie 
flows during other periods and in other colonies appears 
in Smith 1987.) 
Virginia 
Virginia first introduced paper currency in 1754. 
During 1755-60, the per capita stock of paper currency 
in this colony rose 749 percent.
1
4
 While no price index is 
available for colonial Virginia, McCusker's (1978, 
p. 211) sterling exchange rate series shows a currency 
depreciation of only 9 percent during this period.
1
5
 If the 
stock of paper currency provides a reasonable estimate 
of movements in the total money supply, this is a sharp 
empirical refutation of the quantity theory.
1
6 
In 1760-70, the per capita paper currency stock of 
Virginia contracted 98 percent. This massive monetary 
reduction was accompanied by only a 16 percent ap-
preciation of Virginia currency against sterling, which 
again refutes quantity theory predictions. 




 claims to present evidence of offsetting specie 
flows. If correct, this would suggest that the data just 
discussed misrepresent Virginia's monetary situation. 
Michener's evidence consists of "the report of Andrew 
Burnaby, an English traveller who visited Virginia in 
the fall of 1759 .... Burnaby noted that: The use of 
paper currency in this colony has intirely banished from 
it gold and silver.'" 
Does this change the picture of Virginia's monetary 
situation? Clearly not. Even assuming that Burnaby's 
report can be taken at face value, we have to ask 
whether it represents evidence of specie flows that 
offset the changes known to have occurred in the paper 
currency supply. The historical literature provides us 
with an estimate of how much specie there was in 
Virginia by the beginning of 1756: "less than . . . 
£20,000" (Ernst 1973, p. 48; Ernst 1987). In 1757 
alone, Virginia issued £180,000 in paper currency. 
Thus, even if Burnaby was right, only a small fraction of 
the change in the paper currency stock could have been 
offset by specie flows. To summarize, it is possible that 
a focus on movements in the stock of paper money 
overestimates monetary movements in Virginia (which 
I admit in Smith 1985a). However, specie flows cannot 
change the basic picture of a very large increase in the 
colony's money supply. 
Michener (1987) is silent on the topic of specie 
inflows during 1760-70, which he must believe were 
large. Again, the evidence suggests otherwise, since 
existing literature indicates an acute shortage of money 
in Virginia throughout the latter part of the decade 
(Evans 1962). 
New York 
During 1755-60, the per capita paper currency stock of 
New York rose 90 percent. At the same time, the price 
level in New York rose 20 percent and the exchange 
13The quick sketch of events below is fleshed out in Smith 1985a, 1987. 
14All figures on monetary changes in Virginia are derived from Brock's 
measures of this colony's paper currency stock (Brock 1975, Table XXVIII) 
and U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975) data on population. 
15Bordo and Marcotte (1987) and Michener (1987) correctly point out that 
McCusker's (1978) exchange rate series does not present true spot exchange 
rates. McCusker actually presents the price of sterling bills of exchange, which 
were claims to future payment of specie. It is unclear to me from reading these 
authors' works whether they intend this point to be a criticism of the use of 
McCusker's series for the purposes in the text. It should be noted, however, that 
the kind of data McCusker presents is routinely used as if it provided spot 
exchange rates. See, for example, Bezanson, Gray, and Hussey 1935, p. 7. 
Michener (1987, p. 275) also employs McCusker's series in this way. 
16Since Virginia had only introduced paper currency in 1754, this was a 
new regime. Hence, appeals to monetizations and changes in expectations 
might be appropriate here. However, such appeals would have little basis in the 
two colonies discussed below. 
17Bordo (1986) and Bordo and Marcotte (1987) do not claim to provide 
any direct evidence of specie flows, apparently being content to accept 
Michener's arguments. 
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rate against sterling fell only 7 percent. During 1760-
70, these events were reversed. The per capita paper 
currency stock was reduced 86 percent while the price 
level fell only 3 percent and the sterling exchange rate 
remained virtually unchanged. Again, these events are 
consistent with the quantity theory only if there were 
offsetting changes in the stock of specie. (See the 
accompanying table for all figures cited in this and the 
next section.) 
It appears, however, that to the contrary there were 
massive inflows of specie while the paper currency 
supply was increasing and massive outflows of specie 
while the paper currency supply was decreasing. To see 
this, consider the following. During 1755-60, New 
York increased its paper currency stock about 
£231,000. During the same period, New York received 
parliamentary grants from England with a value in 
colonial currency of £195,000 (not all of which was 
specie; see Brock 1975, p. 348). But this only scratches 
the surface of specie inflows during 1755-60. Brock 
(1975, p. 348) tells us that "valuable as the parlia-
mentary grants were in providing specie and exchange, 
they were in New York's case small in comparison to 
the sums of specie brought into the [colony] ... as a 
result of the fact that large numbers of his Majesty's 
forces were located in the colony" at this time. Thus, as 
summarized by Brock (1975, p. 350), "there were 
sizeable importations of specie into New York, both 
from England and from the other colonies." Finally, 
also according to Brock (1975, p. 351), there were 
significant inflows of specie from the West Indies. So 
we know that there were not offsetting specie outflows 
during this period; in fact, in all likelihood, a focus on 
paper currency movements substantially understates 
the extent of the monetary expansion that occurred in 
New York during these years. 
It is also known that New York had massive specie 
outflows during 1762-70. By early December 1763, 
the merchant John Watts wrote, "we have nothing 
remaining but Paper Currency" (Brock 1975, p. 353). 
This situation continued, with Ernst (1973, p. 259) 
describing "the critical shortage of coin" in New York 
throughout 1768. Since we know that there was a great 
deal of specie in New York in the early 1760s, specie 
outflows must have been large, indeed, during this 
period of massive contraction in the paper currency 
stock. 
Thus, in the colony of New York, we know that there 
were no offsetting changes in the specie stock and that, 
in fact, it is quite likely that specie flows magnified 
changes in the money supply. 
Pennsylvania 
Of all the colonies I have considered (in Smith 1984 and 
1985a,b), Pennsylvania is the best candidate for specie 
flows that offset movements in the paper currency 
supply. This is not surprising, in some sense, since 
Pennsylvania was probably the most specie-rich of the 
colonies. It is interesting, then, to consider this colony, 
for it permits an illustration of what heroic assumptions 
are required to generate offsetting specie flows even in 
the most specie-rich of the colonies and in one which 
had an increase in its paper currency stock that was not 
unusual (by the standards of other colonies at this time). 
It will be seen, however, that even if these heroic 
assumptions are accepted, offsetting specie flows are 
not a possibility for the 1760-70 period. 
In 1755-60, the per capita paper currency supply of 
Pennsylvania increased 277 percent. Nevertheless, dur-
ing this time, the price level (in Philadelphia) rose only 
17 percent and Pennsylvania currency appreciated 
against sterling. 
As was true in the other colonies considered, the 
years 1760-70 saw a major monetary contraction in 
Pennsylvania. In this decade, the per capita paper cur-
rency stock was reduced 68 percent. This reduction was 
accompanied by a price level decline (in Philadelphia) 
of only 3 percent and an appreciation of Pennsylvania 
currency against sterling also of only 3 percent. 
The situation with respect to potential changes in the 
stock of specie in Pennsylvania can only be guessed at. 
An obvious problem is that we have no clear idea of 
how much specie was available prior to the monetary 
expansion of 1755-60. This is easy to see in that Brock 
(1975, p. 386) says that "by 1753 complaints of the 
scarcity of currency [which Brock takes to include 
specie] were being received by the assembly" and in the 
same sentence says that "the receiver of the quit rents 
reported... in February of that year that 'full four fifths' 
of the money received by him was gold and silver." 
Without saying why, Brock takes four-fifths as a 
working figure, and Michener (1987, p. 282) appar-
ently follows Brock in this. It is interesting to consider 
the consequences of doing so. 
Since Pennsylvania had £82,500 of paper currency 
in circulation in 1753, if specie were 80 percent of the 
money supply, then the specie stock would have been 
£330,000. In 1753-60, Pennsylvania increased its 
paper currency in circulation £403,700. Interpolating 
population figures suggests a 25 percent increase in the 
population during those years. Michener (1987, p. 282) 
takes the population increase to represent the increase 
in the demand for money. That assumption implies that, 
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Year  £ 
1755  179,076 
1756  230,773 
1757  219,281 
1758  307,198 
1759  481,186 
1760  410,387 
1761  366,158 
1762  330,807 
1763  287,163 
1764  243,885 
1765  166,502 
1766  131,502 
1767  109,799 
1768  87,348 
1769  82,858 
1770  81,591 
1750  84,500 
1751  84,000 
1752  83,500 
1753  82,500 
1754  81,500 
1755  96,000 
1756  147,510 
1757  262,466 
1758  329,774 
1759  433,562 
1760  486,199 
1761  438,104 
1762  349,053 
1763  286,312 
1764  328,058 
1765  302,400 
1766  278,736 
1767  263,860 
1768  234,450 
1769  230,496 




Prices  Exchange Rates 
Colonial 
£ Per 
%  100 £  % 
Index*  Change  Sterling  Change 
66 i  180.13 




70  • +20  172.60  - -7 
79  168.39 
79 - 167.20  < 
77  181.41 
87  189.76 
79  186.73 
74  184.85 
72  - -3  182.80  • -1 
73  177.18 
77  178.96 
74  179.87 
77  172.47 
77 - 165.90 
113.0  170.60 
112.8  169.86 
111.9  166.85 
109.9  167.49 
109.1  168.35 
107.3 i  168.79 
109.6  172.57 
107.1  166.07 
109.6  • +17  159.00  • -6 
125.0  153.52 
125.7 =<  158.61  < 
121.2  172.71 
133.4  176.26 
136.4  173.00 
119.4  172.86 
118.4  - -3  169.90  • -3 
124.7  162.96 
123.7  166.02 
119.7  166.62 
115.9  157.56 














Tor New York, 1910-14 = 100; for Pennsylvania, the monthly average of 1741-45 = 100. 
Sources: Notes: Brock 1975, Tables XVI (NY) and XIX (PA, 1756-70); Lester 1938, p. 353 (PA, 1750-55) 
Population: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, series Z1-19 (NY; PA, 1760-70); Weiss 1970, p. 779 (PA, 1750-55) 
Prices: Warren, Pearson, and Stoker 1932, pp. 215-16 (NY); Bezanson, Gray, and Hussey 1935, p. 433 (PA) 
Exchange Rates: McCusker 1978, pp. 164-65 (NY), pp. 185-86 (PA) 
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over this period, with an unchanged price level, Penn-
sylvania could have accommodated (under the quantity 
theory) a money supply of roughly £515,500. This 
implies a net specie outflow of about £300,000. Thus, 
offsetting specie flows are a logical possibility if one 
accepts Brock's estimate that 80 percent of the money 
supply was specie in 1753. (For future reference, this 
would have left Pennsylvania with about £30,000 in 
specie in 1760.) An even larger gross outflow of specie 
would have been required to accomplish this, however, 
since we know that Pennsylvania experienced an 
"influx of specie... in the early years of the [French and 
Indian] war" (Brock 1975, p. 387).
1
8
 Even Michener 
(1987, p. 283) presents evidence of specie flows into 
Pennsylvania from other colonies during these years. 
He also argues (p. 283) that during 1758-60, "Penn-
sylvania's earnings of foreign exchange [were] excep-
tionally high." Thus, while offsetting specie flows are a 
possibility (under Brock's estimate), they require enor-
mous gross outflows of specie. 
Moreover, as seen above, Brock's estimate that 80 
percent of Pennsylvania's money supply was specie 




 Replacing Brock's 80 percent with 
Michener's 67 percent leaves Pennsylvania with a 
specie stock of roughly £165,000 in 1753. By my 
calculations, under this scenario, even if Pennsylvania 
was devoid of specie by 1760, its per capita money 
supply would have increased over 57 percent during 
1755-60. This is more than triple the percentage 
increase in the price level. Finally, these calculations 
could be repeated with more conventional estimates of 
the specie component of the money supply. Recall that 
Letwin's (1981) upper bound on this figure is 40 per-
cent. Replacing Brock's 80 percent with 40 percent 
gives Pennsylvania a specie stock of about £55,000 in 
1753. Thus, offsetting specie flows are a logical 
possibility only if one accepts an immense figure for the 
specie component of the money supply. 
Suppose one takes an agnostic stand on this issue and 
admits that there are possible scenarios under which 
changes in the Pennsylvania currency stock (from 1755 
to 1760) were offset by specie flows. What was the 
situation from 1760 to 1770? During this period of 
immense reductions in the per capita paper currency 
stock, it is probable that there were net outflows of 
specie. Even Michener (1987, p. 284) indicates that 
Pennsylvania exported specie during the early 1760s 
and that "by July 1762, local supplies of specie were 
greatly reduced." (Recall that even under Brock's 
estimate, Pennsylvania would have had only about 
£30,000 of specie in 1760 if offsetting specie outflows 
had occurred. How were these specie shipments accom-
plished if there had been offsetting specie flows during 
1755-60?) Moreover, according to Ernst (1973, 
p. 102), outflows of specie continued from 1763 to 
1766: "By the beginning of 1766 the amount of paper in 
circulation ran close to £290,000 out of the total of 
£330,000 outstanding at the end of the war. Coin 
supplies apparently diminished far more rapidly." And 
while Michener (1987, p. 285) claims that "Pennsyl-
vania imported substantial amounts of specie" in 1766 
and 1767, Ernst (1973, p. 207) says that "by late 1767 
and through the next year numerous newspaper articles 
appeared citing the great scarcity of money." Thus, 
specie imports could not have been too substantial. 
Michener (1987, p. 285) also says that "merchant 
letters suggest that the specie inflow was halted or 
reversed in 1768." Therefore, it is clear that there were 
not significant inflows of specie during this decade and 
that quite likely there were net outflows.
2
0 
What does the Pennsylvania evidence indicate, 
then? If there were offsetting specie outflows during 
1755-60, there must have been almost no specie in 
Pennsylvania by 1760. Since specie flows could there-
fore not have been very important during 1760-70, 
movements in the stock of paper currency must present 
a reasonably accurate picture of the monetary situation 
in Pennsylvania during this decade: A 68 percent 
reduction in the money supply occurred in the face 
of almost constant prices and currency values. Yet if 
there were not offsetting specie flows during 1755-60, 
the quantity theory cannot explain the relative price 
stability of this period. Thus, either way, the colonial 
data provide sharp evidence contradicting the quantity 
theory. 
... And Fixed vs. Flexible Exchange Rates 
To summarize, the evidence as it currently exists 
indicates that movements in the money supply (as 
18Brock's reference appears to be to the years 1756 and 1757. 
19Since economic conditions are unlikely to have been much different in 
1774 than in 1753 (at least with respect to per capita real income and nominal 
interest rates), under the quantity theory the level of real balances per capita 
should have been roughly the same in these two years. If one believes specie was 
about two-thirds of the money supply in 1774, then it must also have been about 
two-thirds of the money supply in 1753 in order to conform to such a prediction. 
20This conclusion is in complete accordance with the conclusions of all 
other historical studies of this period. For instance, Walton and Shepherd (1979, 
pp. 104-5), studying the period 1768-72, say of the colonies in general: "Only 
if balance-of-payments surpluses consistently had been earned would the 
colonies have accumulated an adequate supply of circulating coin. We are 
justified in assuming that balance-of-payments surpluses did not occur, since no 
such supply did accumulate." 
27 measured by the stock of paper currency) cannot 
generally have been offset by specie flows. (I review 
further evidence on this point in Smith 1987.) Why, 
then, do Bordo (1986), Bordo and Marcotte (1987), and 
Michener (1987) believe that offsetting specie flows 
should have (or did) occur?
2
1
 This belief is apparently 
dictated by their view that the colonies operated under 
a fixed exchange rate regime. As seen above, this view 
(in conjunction with the quantity theory) would direct 
them to expect such specie flows. Of course, that these 
flows did not occur indicates that the quantity theory 
is inconsistent with colonial evidence. However, it is 
also possible to ask whether it is reasonable to think of 
the colonies as operating under a fixed exchange rate 
regime. 
In studying the colonial exchange rate regime, it 
is important to distinguish between what historians call 
the par of exchange and the commercial exchange rate. 
Recall from above that, even before many colonies 
issued paper currency, they had local units of account 
called pounds. This unit of account was defined by 
setting a value, in colonial pounds, for a Spanish piece 
of eight. This legislated value defined the par of ex-
change. 
The par of exchange was not an exchange rate, 
however. Colonial governments neither intended nor 
expected that this legislated rate would obtain in private 
transactions, nor did the governments attempt to en-
force or maintain the par of exchange as an exchange 
rate. 
The exchange rate that prevailed in individual 
transactions is referred to as the commercial rate of 
exchange. This rate is logically distinct from the par 
of exchange; as McCusker (1978, p. 21) says, "par was 
only a benchmark; the commercial rate of exchange 
fluctuated around par." What determined the commer-
cial rate of exchange? Again quoting McCusker (1978, 
p. 22): "The final and most important influence on the 
commercial rate of exchange was the state of the 
market for bills of exchange. Here, of course, the laws 
of supply and demand were at work." Did the commer-
cial rate actually differ from the par of exchange? 
According to Governor Lewis Morris of New Jersey 
(quoted in McCusker 1978, p. 116), "the collonies on 
the continent very much differ in [the] proportion [that] 




 This is clearly the description of a flexible 
exchange rate regime. 
Bordo (1986), Bordo and Marcotte (1987), and 
Michener (1987) do not accept this characterization, 
however. I will now attempt to sketch my understand-
ing of their views and my evaluation of them. This is 
easiest for the Bordo/Bordo-Marcotte position. Bordo 
and Marcotte (1987, pp. 312-13) state that "South 
Carolina . . . fixed the exchange rate between its 
currency and the British pound sterling at 7:1." At this 
point it is clear, however, that they have simply 
confused the par of exchange with the commercial rate 
of exchange. 
To emphasize that colonial governments did not 
enforce the par of exchange as an exchange rate, I need 
only point to the expressed attitude of colonial courts 
and legislatures toward what Bordo and Marcotte view 
as a fixed rate. For instance, Ernst (1973, p. 54) tells us 
that in 1755 the Virginia House of Burgesses amended 
an act in order "to allow courts of record to settle all 
executions for sterling debts in local currency ... at a 
'just' rate of exchange. A just rate was taken to be the 
actual rate [that is, not the par of exchange] at the time 
of court judgment." Or as Gipson (1961, p. 263) says, 
"Local courts should have the authority to ascertain the 
difference in exchange between sterling and current 
money." That there was such a difference is clearly 
indicated by the fact that "a significant margin could 
exist between the rate set by the provincial court and the 
commercial rate at the time a debtor finally settled [an] 
account" (Sosin 1964, p. 178). Notice that the legisla-
ture directed the courts not to enforce the par of 
exchange in settlements. Similar court attitudes in New 
York, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina are discussed 
in Smith 1987. Finally, to examine whether legislatures 
ever intended the par of exchange to be an exchange 
rate, we can return to the Virginia House of Burgesses: 
2 Michener (1987, p. 280) asserts that there is evidence in 18th century 
literature that specie flows of the appropriate type did actually occur. He cites 
Smith 1789, p. 307, and Hume [1749] 1955, p. 188.1 read this literature as 
simply asserting the absence of significant amounts of specie in the colonies. 
This cannot support Michener's position, which of course requires the colonies 
to have had an ample stock of specie. 
22Incidentally, McCusker's (1978) description of the colonial monetary 
system is completely standard. The reader interested in confirming this can 
consult Ernst 1973, p. 15: "The rate of exchange [in the colonies was] a price 
determined by the play of market forces." Ernst (p. 15) goes on to present 
examples where specie commanded a premium relative to paper currency 
"despite the laws rating paper and coin as equal" (that is, despite the fixed par of 
exchange). The reader can also consult Ferguson's (1953, p. 15 8) classic piece: 
When "sterling bills [of exchange] became scarce and expensive... specie and 
bills of exchange rose in value relative to paper money." See also Hammond 
1957, p. 10: "The bills of credit of the colonial governments [might]... either... 
be kept equal to specie in value, or not." Other references include Lester 1938, 
p. 325; Weiss 1970, p. 775; and Bullock 1900, p. 78. Soltow's (1958) piece is 
also extremely valuable. It describes the meeting of an organized foreign 
exchange market in Williamsburg. In this market, "when the supply of cash was 
... scarce ... the exchange rate declined. If... there was more money than 
[sterling] Bills [of exchange] . . ., the price of sterling rose" (Soltow 1958, 
p. 475). 
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"No laws, they declared, could guard against the 
fluctuating rate of exchange" (Sosin 1964, p. 180). 
Michener's position is more difficult to describe, 
since he in effect takes two positions. Michener (1987, 
p. 238) begins by saying that Nettels (1934) "discussed 
the rating of foreign coins, the arrangement I believe 
effectively fixed the par of exchange." This is correct 
by definition; but as we have seen, the par of exchange 
and the commercial rate of exchange were not the same 
thing. Michener (1987, p. 258) goes on to argue that 
"exchange rates in many colonies fluctuated within 
specie points about a fixed par of exchange." However, 
Michener later abandons the position that this par of 
exchange was the one fixed by colonial governments. 
Unlike Bordo and Marcotte, Michener recognizes 
that interpreting the colonies as operating under fixed 
exchange rates raises several problems. At least one 
becomes obvious upon reviewing a standard textbook 
definition of a fixed exchange rate system (Parkin 
1984, p. 590): 
A fixed exchange rate regime is one in which the [central 
bank] declares a central or par value at which it will act to 
maintain the value of its currency. It also usually involves 
declaring what is known as an intervention band. That is, in 
declaring a fixed exchange rate, the central bank an-
nounces that if the exchange rate rises above the par value 
by more than a certain percentage amount, then it will 
intervene in the foreign exchange market to prevent the 
rate from moving any further away from the par value. 
Likewise, if the rate falls below the par value by a certain 
percentage amount, the central bank declares that it will 
intervene to prevent the rate from falling any further. 
In order to maintain a fixed exchange rate, the central 
bank stands ready to use its stock of foreign exchange 
reserves to raise or lower the quantity of money out-
standing so as to maintain its price relative to the price of 
some other money. 
Interpreting the colonies as operating under fixed 
exchange rates is difficult because they had no central 
bank, or other entity, that stood ready to maintain any 
fixed rate in this manner. 
Michener recognizes this difficulty but attempts to 
avoid it, by saying (1987, p. 263) that "how this [fixed 
exchange rate] was enforced is an interesting question 
but somewhat beyond the scope of this paper." 
Michener (1987, p. 263) does hazard some guesses, 
however: "The modern institutional arrangement is to 
have a government institution ... which holds reserves 
of foreign exchange and stands ready to exchange 
domestic currency for foreign exchange at the par of 
exchange it wishes to defend. The simple answer may 
be that colonial Treasurers' offices performed this 
function in colonial times." Michener then describes 
some claims by one colonial treasurer to this effect. 
We know that this depiction is inaccurate, however. 
According to Nettels (1934, p. 262), "Acts of issue [of 
money] generally promised that the holders of the 
colony's bills [paper money] might at any time ex-
change them for any stock in the colonial treasury. But 
since the treasuries ordinarily did not have any stock of 
either specie or goods of approved value, this promise 
probably had no effect in maintaining the specie value 
of the bills." Thus, another device is called for. 
Seemingly anticipating this argument, Michener 
(1987, p. 264) offers a second possibility regarding how 
a fixed rate of exchange could have been maintained. In 
particular, he says that "the leading merchants of the 
colony defended the fixed par." To be more specific, he 
asserts that "the principal merchants of a colony would 
actually confer, decide on what ought to be current 
money [that is, the exchange rate], and then attempt to 
persuade others to follow their lead." 
This somewhat surprising assertion would seem to 




 He does not attempt to describe which 
merchants fixed the rate of exchange or show that 
merchants as a group had coincident interests with 
regard to currency values.
2
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 He also does not provide a 
convincing argument that logically it would have been 
feasible for merchants to maintain a fixed exchange 
rate in the manner he describes. 
On the latter point, Michener (1987, p. 265) does 
make some attempt at a defense. He believes that the 
institutional arrangement he describes "effectively 
made currency and specie perfect substitutes at the 
customary valuation." If these objects were perfect 
substitutes, the exchange rate between them would 
have been indeterminate (Kareken and Wallace 1981), 
with merchants free to choose any value they preferred. 
To summarize Michener's (1987, p. 258) position, 
then: In the colonies, "pieces of eight and bills of credit 
[paper money] were used interchangeably as a medium 
of exchange. Colonial currency passed in domestic 
transactions at a customary fixed rate with pieces of 
eight, a rate generally recognized by both the courts and 
2
3
 A modern version of this method for maintaining a fixed exchange rate 
would be the following. Canadian merchants would confer, decide what the 
exchange rate ought to be, and attempt to persuade others to follow their lead. In 
doing so, they would fix the U.S./Canadian exchange rate. (Incidentally, there 
are a number of historical reports of failed attempts by groups of merchants to 
manipulate exchange rates. See Smith 1987, fn. 35.) 
24We know, in fact, that they did not. See, for example, Ernst 1982. 
29 the government, who gave the custom legal sanction." 
And, again, this customary rate was set by merchants. 
This description of events contains at least three 
historical inaccuracies. We have seen above that no 
legal sanction was given to any fixed rates in the 
colonies; we know that the notion that specie and paper 




 and we know that, as a general 
statement about the colonies, the notion that merchants 
fixed rates is unsupportable. For instance, McCusker 
(1978, p. 156) indicates that in 1768 the New York 
"Chamber of Commerce appointed a committee to 
establish the value in New York currency of the major 
coins in circulation." This would hardly have been 
necessary if the merchants making up the Chamber of 
Commerce had either been setting an exchange rate or 




Despite recent arguments, there is no reason to alter 
the standard historical perception of the British North 
American colonies as operating under a flexible ex-
change rate system. There is also no reason to think that 
specie flows occurred in ways that would make colonial 
history consistent with the predictions of the quantity 
theory of money. Moreover, colonial data provide far 
more evidence against the quantity theory than that 
cited above. (See, for example, Smith 1987.) Instead, 
since in the colonies considerable monetary changes 
were accomplished without significant alterations in 
net government balance sheet positions, these data 
support the propositions derived by Wallace (1981) 
and Sargent and me (1986, 1987). In light of the 
similar evidence cumulating from other places and 
periods (Sargent 1982, Bomberger and Makinen 1983, 
Makinen 1984, White 1986, and Imrohoroglu 1987), it 
is necessary to seriously consider the possibility that the 
effects of monetary changes depend as much on how 
they are accomplished as on how large they are. 
25For instance, Ernst (1965, p. 45) presents evidence that "exchange rates 
between specie and sterling often deviated from the figures cited for paper and 
sterling." Thus, these were not used interchangeably. Also of interest is 
McCusker's (1976, p. 97) statement that "a paper bill of credit, with a distinct, 
explicit value in colonial currency, was naturally to be preferred over any given 
coin, the value of which in colonial currency was uncertain or, at least, 
debatable." In short, to colonists, specie and paper money were not perfect 
substitutes. For further details on this point, see McCusker 1976. Finally, since 
specie and paper currency were not perfect substitutes, Michener needs to show 
that it was feasible for merchants to maintain an exchange rate. He does not 
attempt to do so. 
26The New York Chamber of Commerce was quite explicit that its action 
was necessary because paper currency and specie were not circulating at the par 
of exchange. This fact is also apparent in the report of the above-mentioned 
committee. On these points, see Stephens 1971, pp. 52, 56, 316-17. 
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